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Abstract 
The introduction of market-type mechanisms into the public sector has been a feature of many 
of the reforms associated with the New Public Management. In seeking to benefit from the 
competitive pressures exerted through marketization, governments have hoped to gain 
improvements in public service efficiency in particular. Yet, concerns remain about the 
effects of marketization on how equitably public services are provided, with many suggesting 
that there is an ineluctable trade-off between efficiency and equity that goes hand-in-hand 
with market-orientated reforms. In this paper, we review the existing evidence on what is 
known about the relationship between the introduction of market-type mechanisms in the 
European public sector and the efficiency and equity of service provision. Our analysis 
reveals that although market-type mechanisms sometimes result in worse service equity, there 
is only weak evidence of a trade-off between efficiency and equity. We go on to argue that the 
design and implementation of market-based reforms may be a more important determinant of 
their success, rather than their supposed intrinsic characteristics.  
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Introduction 
Market-type mechanisms have been introduced into the public sector in countries all across 
Europe (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Inspired by the dictates of the New Public Management 
(NPM), contracting out (outsourcing), quasi-markets, liberalization, privatization and user-
choice mechanisms have all been used as a tool to drive public service improvement. These 
NPM reforms to the traditional bureaucratic model of service delivery within the public sector 
have typically had efficiency gains as their main objective, but they are also anticipated to 
result in improvements in service quality and organizational effectiveness (Kettl, 2005). The 
introduction of market pressures within the system of public service production is 
hypothesised to facilitate the kind of innovative behaviours and customer orientation inherent 
in a well-functioning market for private goods and services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). By 
encouraging public service organizations to consider private (or not-for-profit) provision of 
services, forcing them to compete for ‘customers’ and by establishing opportunities for 
service users to choose between alternative providers, market-type mechanisms are seen as 
drivers of positive change with benefits for taxpayers and service users alike (Le Grand, 2006; 
Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). However, several observers have suggested that irrespective of 
the potential efficiency gains that might be realised, market-type mechanisms are inherently 
inimical to the equity with which public services are distributed and that this can threaten the 
legitimacy of the state’s role in upholding the public interest (Gilmour and Jensen, 1998; 
Milward and Provan, 2000). In this paper, we contribute to this important debate by reviewing 
the evidence from a range of studies of the impact of market-type mechanisms on access to 
public services in the European public sector. A similar recent study focused on user-choice 
mechanisms and concluded that choice in the public sector can lead to a number of benefits 
but it also presents possible pitfalls policy makers and regulators need to carefully consider 
before introducing or expanding the range of choice in public services (Tummers, Jilke and 
Van de Walle, 2013).  
By emphasising efficiency, it is argued, marketisation inevitably lessens the importance of 
other public service outcomes that are conventionally regarded as being the core business of 
the state, especially the goal of social equity (Fredrickson, 1990). Market-type mechanisms 
are thought to lead public services to be unresponsive to the needs of disadvantaged client 
groups who are difficult or hard to reach, due to the additional time and money required to 
adequately meet their demands and the lack of reward for actually doing so (Koning and 
Heinrich, 2013). From this perspective, marketisation is assumed to damage social equity 
because competitive pressures lead service providers to restrict access to public services for 
less-advantaged people. As a result, marketisation is generally characterised in the literature 
as generating a conflict between the demands of public service efficiency to which it is 
generally directed and the social equity for which governments are held accountable (Wolf, 
1987). All of which is reflected in an on-going need to trade-off efficiency and equity in 
policy and management decisions (Okun, 1975). 
Academic and policy interest in marketisation and social equity has grown during the past 
decade or so, as governments across Europe have increasingly turned to market-type 
mechanisms to achieve their policy objectives. A growing number of empirical studies furnish 
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evidence on the supposed trade-off between efficiency and equity (e.g. Amrikhanyan, 2008; 
Amrikhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2008), so there is a pressing need to systematically review 
and analyse the provenance of this well-worn argument, especially at a time when public 
sector budgets are under pressure and there is pressure to seek market-based solutions to 
public service delivery challenges.  The scale of the research effort devoting to evaluating the 
success of outsourcing, quasi-markets and use choice means that it is now possible to bring 
together the evidence on marketisation and equity in search of some general lessons about the 
impact of market-type mechanisms. Although most of that research has focused on either the 
effects of marketisation on efficiency or equity separately, a growing number incorporate a 
concern with both outcomes, making it possible to evaluate what is known about this critically 
important issue in public administration.  
Do market-type mechanisms result in worse access to public services? Are gains in efficiency 
traded for reductions in public service equity? Is it possible for market-type mechanisms to 
generate improvements in efficiency and equity? We seek to answer these questions by 
carrying out a review and in-depth analysis of the available evidence on the introduction of 
market-type mechanisms and public service equity and efficiency in the European public 
sector. In the following section, we explore the rationale behind the use of market-type 
mechanisms in the public sector, analyzing the potential relationship between the use of 
outsourcing, quasi-markets and user choice on efficiency, as well as equity. Following that, 
we describe the process through which the studies we review were identified and how they 
were analysed. Thereafter, we provide a thick description of those studies, discussing the 
findings in some depth, before concluding by reflecting on the theoretical and practical 
implications of our research. 
 
Theory 
At the heart of the introduction of market-type mechanisms in the public sector is the 
contention that it is necessary to impose competitive pressures on public service providers. 
The roots of this notion can be found in the ideas of public choice theory. For public choice 
theorists, government-managed provision of public services is inherently inefficient because 
rather than hunt out efficiencies within the public service production system, politicians and 
bureaucrats will always behave in a self-interested way. Drawing on neo-classical economics, 
public choice theory suggests that public servants seek to maximize their budget and personal 
interests at the expense of the citizens they purportedly serve (Niskanen, 1971). Due to the 
budget-maximization imperative, it is likely that publicly-managed services will be over-
supplied and that efficiency, in particular, will suffer (Savas, 1987). The application of 
market-type mechanisms such as contracting out, public choice theorists argue, is therefore 
necessary to avoid or minimize the dsyfunctional effects of producerist self-interest. By 
forcing previously protected in-house services into an environment characterized by market 
discipline and competition amongst potential service providers, overall service delivery costs 
should be reduced, whilst the efficiency and quality of public service provision improved 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that marketisation creates 
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problems of its own for public service production, and that this incurs costs for social equity 
especially.  
The impact of public choice ideas on the NPM led to the privatisation or deregulation of many 
public services (see Swann 1988), as well as sustained attempts to either establish compulsory 
competitive tendering processes or establish an internal market for service provision (Eliasson 
and Sitter 2008). Although evidence from a range of research suggests that this marketisation 
has reduced production costs (for reviews see Andrews, 2010; Domberger and Jensen 1997; 
c.f. Bel, Fageda and Warner 2010), it may also lead overall to a deterioration of service 
quality, especially due to poor contract specification, in the case of outsourcing (Knapp et al. 
1999), or the lack of meaningful alternatives in the case of quasi-markets (Wolf, 1987). 
Above all, by introducing competitive pressures and market forces into the public service 
production system, providers have a greater incentive to behave in ways that minimize their 
costs and the task difficulty that they confront. This, in turn, is generally likely to mean that 
those social groups who are most costly and difficult to serve receive the poorest quality 
services, which inevitably results in an inequitable distribution of public services. 
The notion that markets may be efficient yet result in inequitable outcomes in the absence of 
some form of government intervention has a long pedigree within public economics (Lerner, 
1944). Theories of market failure, in particular, suggest that one reason for the state’s 
existence at all is its capacity to ensure that all citizens are able to access public and social 
goods, such as education, culture and leisure, irrespective of ability to pay (Stiglitz 2000). At 
the same time, a key principle underpinning the Weberian rationale for public bureaucracies is 
that the legal-rational basis of the state requires that it treat all citizens, clients or service users 
in exactly the same impersonal way, both in terms of access to services and the distribution of 
those services (du Gay 2000). As Musgrave (1959) puts it, government performs an allocative 
function through which it addresses demands that could not be met through the free market, 
and a distributive function through which it upholds an equitable distribution of goods 
(Musgrave, 1959).  
The scope and need for government intervention in the economy and society to fulfil its 
allocative and distributive roles is, in theory, far-reaching, and equality of access is clearly a 
central feature of the justification for state provision of public services. Yet, the use of 
market-type mechanisms implies the re-introduction of those economic forces, which 
necessitated public provision in the first place, and therefore seems likely to result in sub-
optimal access to services, whatever the potential productive efficiency gains that may be 
realised. The ways in which social equity suffers are likely to be similar across the different 
market-type mechanisms that can be introduced, but will also display important features 
distinctive to the kind of mechanism being implemented.  
In terms of outsourcing, it is conventionally assumed that competitive tendering prompts 
potential providers to focus on improving the quality of their work, as well as reducing costs 
due to the fear that a failure to please public sector clients will lead to a loss of business 
(Savas 1987).  However, skepticism about the consequences of profit maximization incentives 
for service quality in government contracting has grown as the use of private contractors has 
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increased. According to some economists, private provision of public services rarely results in 
desired service improvements because it is plagued by incomplete contracts (Jensen and 
Stonecash, 2005). Due to the challenges involved in measuring the quality of public services, 
it is particularly difficult to fully specify contractual obligations for their provision (Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny,1997), especially to less-advantaged social groups. Even where it is 
possible to more tightly specify performance standards within contracts, providers may still 
have an incentive to game the system in ways that are especially disadvantageous to poor or 
socially excluded groups through tactics, such as ‘cream-skimming’ and ‘parking’ (Koning 
and Heinrich, 2013).  
The introduction of quasi-markets within the public sector too is envisaged to be efficiency 
enhancing, principally because of its facility for forcing providers to compete to provide the 
best-quality service at the lowest cost (Le Grand, 2006). Where citizens have some choice 
about the provider of the services they need, it is assumed that the threat of their “exit” is 
sufficient to keep their current provider “on their toes”. However, one prerequisite for 
injecting competitive pressures into the public sector through quasi-markets and choice is the 
existence of multiple service providers who are able to compete for ‘customers’ – an 
assumption that holds more strongly for some services (e.g. nursing homes), than others (e.g. 
high schools), and may vary due to external factors, such as population sparsity or decline. 
Another prerequisite for a well-functioning public sector market is the availability of clear and 
comparable information on the performance of different providers, which is hypothesised to 
lead to better services by enhancing the “voice” of service users and their awareness of “exit” 
options (Hirschman 1970). Although there is some evidence that citizens are responsive to 
performance information cues (James, 2011; James and John, 2007), there is little evidence to 
date that this dramatically improves the access to services of those who most need them. 
Theoretically speaking, the prospects of marketisation resulting in better social equity seem 
remote – incomplete contracts and market failure are simply too consistent a theme in public 
sector markets. Nevertheless, while the consequences of market-type mechanisms for social 
equity are typically regarded as negative, there are several ways in which policies 
characteristic of such reforms might still be given a positive equity twist (Harrow 2002). In 
particular, outsourcing, competition and choice mechanisms might improve equality of 
opportunity by placing greater pressure on the providers of public services to be responsive to 
customer demand (Le Grand 2006). Opportunities for service users from disadvantaged 
communities to switch provider may therefore represent a much-needed means for 
pressurizing public service providers to do better for those whose voice is not necessarily as 
strong (Hirschman, 1970; Le Grand, 2006). At the same time, a growth in consumerism 
within public services can have distributional benefits by prompting equality of access and 
consistency in the treatment of service users (see Pollitt 1988). Hence, it is conceivable that 
the conventional picture of a straight trade-off between efficiency and equity may be 
incorrect, or that, at the least, the relationship between efficiency and equity in the wake of 
marketisation may require some nuancing.  
To better understand the complexities of this issue, we review the available evidence on 
market-type mechanisms and access to public services in the European public sector. We 
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begin with a detailed explanation of how we undertook the review, before offering an in-depth 
discussion of the findings and their implications for public administration theory and practice.   
 
Case selection 
In selecting cases of market-type mechanisms, we used the database of NPM studies created 
as part of the Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) project. 
This database includes 519 studies and is a result of a comprehensive search for NPM 
literature across Europe from 1980 to 2011 (Pollitt and Dan, 2011; Pollitt and Dan, 2013). 
Most studies in the database are academic (68%) while the rest are official and independent 
evaluations, policy reports, consultancy studies and reports by international organizations.  
Market-type mechanisms are only a component, though a significant one, of NPM, and only a 
portion of the database includes relevant data on market-type mechanisms. Furthermore, 
within this subcategory only a part incorporates evidence on equal access to public services. 
Therefore to review the evidence on the effects of MTMs on equal access, the database was 
narrowed down to include only the relevant material. In selecting the specific dataset of 
relevant studies we followed these two steps:  
1) We first filtered the database to include only the studies on market-type mechanisms. This 
resulted in an initial dataset of 73 studies on contracting out (14.2% of the total database), 21 
items on user choice mechanisms (4.1% of the database) and 21 studies on other MTMs, 
which include quasi/internal markets, use of vouchers, application of user charges and 
liberalization and privatization reform. Altogether these represent close to one fourth of the 
initial database.  
2) Second, the resulting dataset was further filtered to incorporate only the studies that 
included empirical evidence on equal access following the application of MTMs in European 
public sectors. We followed the following approach to empirical evidence. First we selected 
the academic sources that used quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence. Second, we 
selected those official evaluations and policy studies that drew upon significant empirical 
evidence or made an evidence-based argument about the impact of MTMs on service access. 
Exceptionally, we allowed in a limited number of analytic overviews that did not introduce 
new original evidence but drew upon a significant body of evidence. While this approach did 
not allow the use of classical meta-analytical techniques, quantification of the size of effects, 
and the assessment of statistical significance, it enabled us to draw on more sources across 
different countries. Moreover, qualitative, thick-description studies have the merit of 
providing the opportunity to assess contextual factors and underlying mechanisms through 
which market tools affect equity. They not only tell whether market instruments lead to 
deteriorations, improvements or no change in equity but potentially they can also indicate 
why and how this is the case.  
This selection process resulted in 20 case studies of the effect of MTMs on equal access in 
European public sectors. To code and synthesize the data systematically, the study used an 
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analytical framework that identifies the type of MTMs being assessed, country and policy 
area, method used in each study and impact on equity. Starting from the standard premise in 
policy studies that equity and efficiency have different determinants and are likely to change 
differently as a result of the introduction of market forces, we were interested in synthesizing 
any evidence on efficiency, in addition to equity, available in each study. We report this in a 
different column, but due to the limited evidence on the technical, input-output ratio definition 
of efficiency, we also included evidence on savings, reduction in inputs and changes in 
processes (i.e. faster service). Finally, to explain variation in impacts we extracted relevant 
determinants of change in equity and report these in a separate column. In this way, the paper 
can show why a given MTM worked in a specific context and policy area but failed to work 
in a different context.  
 
Description of cases 
The 20 cases reviewed can be divided into three categories: contracting out (outsourcing), 
quasi-markets and other MTMs. Other MTMs include liberalization and privatization of 
services of general interest (two cases), user-choice mechanisms (two cases), user charges 
(two cases) and two cases of MTMs that do not fall into any of these categories. The dataset 
includes eight cases of contracting out, eight cases of other MTMs and four studies of quasi-
market arrangements (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Number of cases by type of market-type mechanism 
Type of MTM Number of cases 
Contracting out 8 
Quasi-market arrangements 4 
Other MTMs 8 
Total  20 
 
The cases span different regions of Europe, and include examples from Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as from some of the largest western European 
states: UK (four cases), France (three cases), Germany (three cases) and Italy (two cases). We 
notice that the cases of contracting-out and quasi-market arrangements included in the study 
are largely concentrated in the west of Europe while the cases of other MTMs are largely 
derived from the new EU member states and the former Soviet Union. In terms of policy area, 
healthcare is by far the best represented sector with ten cases followed by employment 
services with four cases, and other policy areas with six cases (tables 2, 3 and 4 below).  
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Table 2: Distribution of cases of contracting out by country and policy area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of cases of quasi-market arrangements by country and policy area 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of cases of other MTMs by country and policy area 
Country Policy area 
UK Education, healthcare and social housing 
UK Housing 
UK and Spain Economic policy 
Estonia Healthcare 
Czech Republic Healthcare 
Hungary Healthcare 
Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine and Armenia  Healthcare 
EU member states Economic policy 
 
In terms of type of study, most studies (14 out of 20) are academic while six are official 
evaluations or studies by consultancy organizations. Seven studies employed quantitative 
methods, six used qualitative case studies, and two each are quasi experiments, analytic 
overviews and mixed-method studies.  
Table 5 below presents all coded data including the evidence on access, efficiency and 
explanatory factors.  
 
 
Country Policy area 
France Employment 
France Employment 
France Law and justice 
Germany Employment 
Germany Employment 
Italy Healthcare 
Italy Local services 
Norway Welfare 
Country Policy area 
UK Healthcare  
Germany Healthcare 
Germany and the Netherlands Healthcare 
France Healthcare 
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ID Reference 
Market-type 
mechanism 
(MTM) 
Country Policy Method 
 
Impact on 
access 
 
 
Impact on 
efficiency 
Explanatory factors 
329 Divay, 2009 
Contracting 
out 
France  Employment 
Academic 
multiple case 
study 
Unchanged No data  
-Differences between the three private 
providers: job seekers are more satisfied with 
a personalized approach compared to a 
‘technical’ one favored by the other two 
providers 
-No significant change in access to job 
market following contracting out 
472 
Behaghel, 
Crépon and 
Gurgand, 2009 
Contracting 
out 
France Employment 
Quasi-
experimental 
academic 
study 
Improved 
Faster 
registration, 
improved 
processes 
-Two programs evaluated and compared 
focused on hard-to-place job seekers 
-Significant higher placement in both cases 
-Success factors: personalized counselling 
and support, good counsellor-job-seeker ratio 
-Financial incentives allocated may further 
explain greater effectiveness 
531 
Cour de 
Comptes, 2010 
Contracting 
out 
France 
Law and 
justice 
External 
official 
evaluation 
 
 
Unchanged 
Improved 
processes 
-Equal access did not change due to different 
practices in prison administration 
-Growth in crime rate in the external 
environment is said to significantly affect 
effectiveness 
302 
Kaps and 
Schütz, 2007 
Contracting 
out 
Germany Employment 
Quasi-  
experimental 
external 
evaluation 
Unchanged 
Unchanged 
 
-Demanding requirements of operation 
hamper efficiency gains 
-High transaction costs 
 
304 
Pfeiffer and 
Winterhager, 
2006 
Contracting 
out 
Germany Employment 
Quantitative 
consultancy 
study 
Improved 
placement 
through use of 
vouchers 
No data  
- Use of vouchers is more effective than 
public commissioning of a third-party 
provider 
- No detailed explanation of differences 
356 Macinati, 2006 
Contracting 
out 
Italy Healthcare 
Quantitative 
academic 
study 
Deteriorated Unchanged 
-Lack of strategic planning affecting reform 
-High transaction costs restrict efficiency 
gains 
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375 
Italian 
Department of 
Civil Service, 
2005 
Contracting 
out 
Italy 
Local 
services 
more 
generally 
Quantitative 
external 
official 
evaluation 
Unchanged No data 
-Need for closer monitoring and evaluation of 
contracting out processes as well as outputs 
and outcomes 
 
144 Nylehn, 2004 
Contracting 
out 
Norway 
Welfare and 
social care 
Academic 
case study 
Improved 
Improved 
savings and 
processes 
- Better personalized care offered by private 
institutions 
- More effective financial management in 
private compared to public institutions 
 
551 
Cookson et al., 
2010 
Quasi-market 
arrangements 
UK Healthcare  
Quantitative 
academic 
study 
Unchanged No data 
-Strong ethical norms are said to positively 
affect access 
-The degree of competition: a greater degree 
may influence norms and affect equal access 
159 Mosebach, 2009 
Quasi-market 
arrangements 
Germany Healthcare 
Academic 
analytic 
overview 
Unchanged No data None 
336 
Gӧtze, Cacace 
and Rothgang, 
2009 
Quasi-market 
arrangements 
Germany 
and the 
Netherlands 
Healthcare 
Academic 
multiple case 
study 
Unchanged No data 
-Risk adjustment measures were introduced 
in both countries to ensure financial 
protection  
 
328 Schweyer, 2010 
Quasi-market 
arrangements 
France Healthcare 
Academic 
case study 
Unchanged No data None 
130 
Public 
Administration 
Select 
Committee, 
2005 
User choice 
mechanisms 
UK 
Education, 
healthcare 
and social 
housing 
Official 
qualitative 
analytic 
overview 
Unchanged No data 
-Choice could improve access if careful 
safeguards were designed into choice 
arrangements 
-Choice and voice are not always a priority 
for users 
-Guarantee of certain standard is needed 
-Design and implementation of choice 
scheme is critically important 
-Need to ensure that the voice of users and 
staff is considered 
138 Atun et al., 2006 
User choice 
mechanisms 
Estonia Healthcare 
Academic 
mixed- 
methods 
Improved 
Improved at 
healthcare 
system level 
- Strong management and leadership 
- Good coordination between design and 
implementation 
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study - Early investment in training 
- Development of a critical mass of 
supporters on the ground 
 
256 Krutilová, 2010 User charges 
Czech 
Republic 
Healthcare 
Academic 
quantitative 
study  
Deteriorated 
for specific 
types of 
medical care 
No data 
-Use of some services decreased more than 
others, i.e. primary case home visits (26% 
drop) and use of medication (30.17% drop in 
2008 and 27.65% in 2009) compared  to 
ordinary consultations  
-No significant change in inpatient care due 
to price inelasticity 
-Age and gender play a role 
-No data on the impact on systemic efficiency 
404 Nagyistók, 2010 User charges Hungary Healthcare 
Academic 
case study 
Deteriorated 
Improved 
through 
rationing 
-User charges were suspended one year after 
introduction as a result of a referendum 
-Communication and implementation 
problems 
-Decreasing political support 
73 
Clifton and 
Díaz-Fuentes, 
2010 
Liberalization 
and 
privatization  
EU member 
states 
Business and 
economic 
Academic 
quantitative 
study 
Unchanged for 
certain socio-
economic 
groups 
No data 
- Variation across the EU, type of public 
utility and socio-economic characteristics of 
users  
- Lower access to services in rural compared 
to urban areas 
-Age matters for IT&C services 
74 
Clifton et al., 
2010 
Liberalization 
and 
privatization 
Spain and 
UK 
Business and 
economic 
Academic 
quantitative 
study 
Deteriorated 
for some 
services and 
socio-
economic 
groups 
No data 
-Financial crisis seen as the major factor 
-Type of public utility and elasticity type 
-Age influences the use of IT&C  
-Residence: lower usage of gas and internet 
-Education influences internet usage 
 
33 
Audit 
Commission, 
2002 
MTMs more 
generally 
UK Housing  
External 
evaluation 
using  mixed 
methods 
Unchanged 
Improved 
processes 
-Central government increased capital 
available for repairs and renovations 
-Housing markets vary significantly in terms 
of value, economic potential and local 
capacity 
12 
 
 
596 
Nemec and 
Kolisnichenko, 
2006 
MTMs more 
generally 
Czech 
Republic, 
Russia, 
Ukraine and 
Armenia 
Healthcare 
Academic 
multiple case 
study 
Deteriorated Deteriorated 
- Economic situation of each country: more 
favorable in new EU members states than in 
the former Soviet Union 
- Introduction of user charges found to affect 
access 
-Informal payments negatively affect access 
-Lack of effective patient charters and 
complaints system 
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Mixed effects of market-type mechanisms on access and efficiency 
We first begin with the big picture and then present emerging patterns of factors that were 
found significant in explaining the effects of market mechanisms on service access across the 
selected cases. We see that the general picture is mixed with improvements in access in some 
cases and deterioration or no change in other cases (Table 6 below). The greatest category is 
unchanged access (55%) followed by deteriorated (25%) and improved access with 20% of 
the set of studies. The documented effects on efficiency are slightly more positive than those 
on equity with 30% of the studies finding some evidence of improvements in efficiency. This 
percentage includes efficiency measures in a broad sense, including improvements in 
processes (e.g. faster service), savings and more broadly decreases in inputs. However, 65% 
of the cases have either included no evidence on efficiency or found efficiency to have not 
changed significantly (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: The effect of market-type mechanisms on access and efficiency 
  
Improved Deteriorated Unchanged No data 
20% 25% 55% 0% Access 
30% 5% 10% 55% Efficiency 
Note: Percentage of the total set of 20 cases 
 
If we look at the change in access following the application of specific types of MTMs in 
European public sectors, we see differences between contracting out, quasi markets and other 
forms of MTMs. Seven out of the eight cases of contracting out have either led to 
improvements in access or to no change. Other MTMs (i.e. user charges, user-choice 
mechanisms, and liberalization and privatization), by contrast, have in four cases out of eight 
led to a deterioration in access while in three cases no significant change was found (Table 7).  
 
Table 7: The effect of market-type mechanisms on access by type of market-type mechanism 
Improved Deteriorated Unchanged Total 
3 1 4 8 Contracting out 
0 0 4 4 Quasi-market arrangements 
1 4 3 8 Other market-type mechanisms 
Note: The numbers refer to the number of cases  
 
There are also differences depending on policy area. Equal access in healthcare (the largest 
category) deteriorated in four out of the ten healthcare studies, did not change in five cases 
and improved in one case. In employment services, however, the general picture is more 
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optimistic: half of the cases found evidence of improved access while the other half 
documented no significant change. None of these cases documented decreased access. In 
other policy areas, most studies (four out of six) concluded that MTMs did not lead to a 
significant change in equal access (Table 8).  
Table 8: The effect of market-type mechanisms on access by policy area 
Improved Deteriorated Unchanged Total 
1 4 5 10 Healthcare 
2 0 2 4 Employment 
1 1 4 6 Other policy area 
Note: The numbers refer to the number of cases  
 
Table 9 below maps the relationship between MTMs, on the one hand, and access and 
efficiency, on the other hand. The data show the following. First, there are a limited number 
of cases in which access and efficiency changed in the same direction – four out of twenty 
studies (three positive and one negative case). Second, critics have argued that market 
instruments will lead to decreased access and no improvement in efficiency while the 
proponents of MTMs have claimed improvements in efficiency and no significant change in 
equal access. There are a number of cases in the dataset that fall into each of these two 
categories (20% and 25% respectively), although they are not the largest categories. The 
picture is more nuanced with a high proportion of studies indicating no significant change in 
access and no significant change or no data on efficiency. Overall, this great variation across 
cases calls for identification of determinants of success or failure and explanation why in a 
certain case equity improved while in another it did not change or it worsened.  
 
Table 9: Mapping the relationship between market-type mechanisms, access and efficiency 
Access and efficiency Percent 
Deterioration in access + deterioration in efficiency 5% 
Improvement in access + improvement in efficiency 15% 
Deterioration in access + unchanged or improved efficiency 20% 
Deterioration in access + no improvement in efficiency 20% 
Improved or unchanged access + improvement in efficiency  25% 
Note: Percent of the total set of 20 case studies 
 
Trading off access and efficiency? 
Market-type mechanisms were, on the one hand, expected to lead to efficiency improvements 
and, on the other hand, to deteriorations in equal access to services. The set of studies 
reviewed in this paper, however, shows that only one fourth of studies have found evidence 
consistent with these theoretical expectations. Table 5 shows that only five out of 20 studies 
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indicated that access deteriorated following the introduction of market-type mechanisms. In 
terms of efficiency, six out of 20 cases found some evidence of improved efficiency. This 
implies that in the majority of situations considered in this paper the results of market-type 
mechanisms are inconsistent with theory. This applies to both access and efficiency. 
Furthermore, though it is typically expected that market-type mechanisms will lead to a trade-
off between equity and efficiency, we found little evidence pointing in this direction. Rather 
than change in opposite directions, the existing data seem to indicate that service access and 
efficiency have changed in the same way or have not changed at all. There are few studies 
that provide solid evidence on both access and efficiency, but the evidence reviewed seems to 
provide little ground for a trade-off between equity and efficiency.   
In what follows we analyze explanatory factors that have influenced the impact of market-
type mechanisms on service access on the basis of Table 5. These factors can be intrinsic to 
the market-type mechanism or extrinsic, but nevertheless possibly influential. The first 
category of explanatory factors concern the inherent attributes of a market-type mechanism – 
the logic of the mechanism – as applied to the public sector while extrinsic factors concern the 
context in which a market-type mechanism is designed and implemented and characteristics 
of policy design and implementation.    
Contracting out 
The relationship between contracting out public services to private providers and service 
access is not clear cut based on the dataset. However, more studies have found positive or 
unchanged effects on equal access rather than negative (Table 5). Three cases out of eight 
found some evidence of improvements in access, four cases indicated that access did not 
change significantly and one study showed that access deteriorated. Outsourcing employment 
services in France resulted in one case in wider access for hard-to-place job seekers 
(Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand, 2009) while another study found no significant change in 
access (Divay, 2009). In the former study significant higher placement was found in two 
programs following contracting out, which was attributed to improved interaction, counselling 
and support. An important additional factor consisted of financial incentives that proved 
effective. The study documented improvements in processes in the form of faster registration. 
Similarly, Divay (2009) argued that job seekers were most satisfied with those private 
providers that offered personalized counselling rather than ‘technical’ advice. It is important 
to note, however, that while contracting out facilitated these improvements, the technique 
itself may or may not have proved effective. It was the novel design of the mechanism 
focused on personalized support that mattered rather than the mechanism itself. This implies 
that direct provision may well have worked had it benefited from the same attributes as 
private provision. Contracting out, nevertheless had the merit of finding novel ways of placing 
hard-to-employ job seekers and in this sense was deemed overall successful in these studies. 
In the same policy area two German studies found improved access in one case and no 
significant change in another (Kaps and Schütz, 2007; Pfeiffer and Winterhanger, 2006). In 
this case the use of vouchers was shown to be more effective than public commissioning of 
third-party providers, but no detailed explanation of differences were documented (Pfeiffer 
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and Winterhanger, 2006). Similarly the study found no evidence on efficiency. Kaps and 
Schütz (2007), in a quasi-experimental evaluation, concluded that both access and efficiency 
remained unchanged, and demanding requirements of operation and transaction costs 
hampered efficiency gains. The question arises whether these factors were intrinsic to 
contracting out and whether a different design and implementation could have kept the 
administrative burden under reasonable control.  
The set of studies also include examples of contracting out in other policy areas. A study by 
the French Cour de Comptes showed that contracting out prison services did not lead to a 
significant change in access but, nevertheless, led to improvements in processes (Cour de 
Comptes, 2010).  The factors that were found instrumental to these results included the 
application of different practices in prison administration which hindered equal access and 
overall a growth in crime rates which put more pressure on prison administration. These 
factors appear extrinsic to the market-type mechanism – a different design and application of 
the technique may have led to different outcomes, and a more favorable context would have 
likely altered the outcome. Examples in other sectors (e.g. local services, healthcare and social 
care) and countries (e.g. Italy and Norway) cast further light on the effect of contracting out. 
A study by the Italian Department of Civil Service, for example, provided no data on 
efficiency and found unchanged service access (Italian Department of Civil Service, 2005). 
To explain this finding the study argued that closer monitoring and evaluation of contracting 
out practices would have likely improved effectiveness. In health and social care, Macinati 
(2006) documented that access deteriorated while efficiency remained unchanged. Two main 
explanatory factors hampered access and efficiency: lack of strategic planning and high 
transaction costs. In a Norwegian study, Nylehn (2004) found improvements in access and 
savings following contracting out social services. The author argued that private institutions 
provided more personalized care and proved to be more financially responsible compared to 
their public counterparts.  
These cases of contracting out across policy areas and countries show that factors external to 
contracting out itself proved instrumental. Few of these studies seem to contest the logic of 
contracting out or the practice itself, but rather the design or implementation of the tool and its 
suitability given a specific external context. It is likely that under different circumstances 
contracting out would have fared differently. Another observation is that there is limited 
evidence pointing to a tradeoff between access and efficiency. None of the studies document 
deteriorated access and improved efficiency or vice versa. The pattern that seems to find more 
support in the data is no change in one of these two desiderata together with improvements or 
no significant change in the other. The relationship between contracting out, equal access and 
efficiency seems inconsistent with simplistic theoretical expectations.  
Quasi-market arrangements 
The four cases of quasi-market arrangements reviewed have a number of characteristics in 
common (Table 5). They were all applied in Western European healthcare systems (France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK), all four are academic studies and all found no 
significant change in service access. No data on efficiency was included as efficiency 
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apparently was not part of the analysis. Cookson et al. (2010) tested whether a small dose of 
competition in the English NHS internal market affected socioeconomic healthcare inequality. 
The study found no effect on inequality but argued that the degree of competition is likely to 
have played a role: a greater degree of competition may have affected inequality. Strong 
ethical and professional norms, the study found, are key to protect against “cream skimming” 
– treating patients that are least costly to treat. A focus on the market logic is thought to 
stimulate cream skimming and similar behaviors, but strong professional ethics is likely to act 
as a guard against these tendencies. Similarly, the German and Dutch case (Gӧtze, Cacace and 
Rothgang, 2009) usefully identified explanatory factors that were found to be related to 
access. Risk adjustment measures introduced in both the German and Dutch healthcare 
systems ensured financial protection for socio-economically disadvantaged groups. The 
authors found evidence that risk adjustment was effective in curbing threats to access to 
healthcare.  
Other market-type mechanisms 
Examples of other market-type mechanisms in the dataset include user choice mechanisms 
and user charges in healthcare in Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary (Atun et al., 2006; 
Krutilová, 2010; Nagyistók, 2010) liberalization and privatization across the EU (Clifton and 
Díaz-Fuentes, 2010; Clifton et al., 2010) and market-type mechanisms more generally (Audit 
Commission, 2002; Nemec and Kolisnichenko, 2006). Unlike the studies on contracting out 
and quasi-market arrangements, where evidence on deteriorated access was minimal, 50% of 
the cases of other market-type mechanisms documented some evidence on decreased access 
(Table 7). In terms of policy area, healthcare seems to be most closely related to deteriorated 
access following the introduction of user charges and user choice. Furthermore, studies in 
Central and Eastern Europe are more likely to report deteriorations than the studies in 
Western Europe. This may be due to the socio-economic situation and the novelty and lack of 
experience in using market-type mechanisms in a transitional context. Examples of 
introducing user fees and charges at the point of delivery have virtually universally met with 
resistance and decreased patient satisfaction (e.g. Nagyistók, 2010). A possible explanation 
for this observation is that unlike other forms of market-type mechanisms, which concern how 
a public service is provided and by whom, user charges and user choice are more closely 
related with access. For example, the introduction of user charges (co-payments) in primary 
healthcare in Czech Republic led to a decrease in the use of some services (Krutilová, 2010). 
A 26% drop was documented in primary home care visits compared to ordinary consultations, 
and a significant decrease in the use of medication (30.17% in 2008 and 27.65% in 2009). 
Due to lower price elasticity in inpatient care, however, no significant change was 
documented in secondary care. The case of introducing user charges in the healthcare system 
in Hungary shows how controversial user charges can be – one year after introduction they 
were suspended through referendum (Nagyistók, 2010). Communication and implementation 
problems in a context of decreasing political support influenced the perception of the success 
of these mechanisms. It is debatable whether better communication (given the novelty of the 
change), effective implementation and political support would have changed the outcome. 
Nor is it easy to conclude that a decrease in the use of some services is necessarily a “bad 
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thing” as long as clinical healthcare outcomes remain unchanged or potentially improve. More 
of some service or some medication is not necessarily or always better. To improve the 
efficiency and sustainability of the healthcare system as a whole, it is well-known that fees for 
some services may need to be introduced or increased. However, regardless of these 
considerations, from a patient perspective, co-payments are likely to be met with resistance 
and affect patient satisfaction.   
Liberalization of public utilities was found in one study to have narrowed access for certain 
services and disadvantaged socio-economic groups (Clifton et al., 2010) while another study 
looking across the EU found that access did not change significantly (Clifton and Díaz-
Fuentes, 2010). In the first case, the financial crisis, and less so the reform itself, was seen as a 
major barrier to equal access. The same argument can be made for other cases in the dataset. 
According to another study, the less favorable economic condition of countries of the former 
Soviet Union compared to those in Central Europe was one of the main factors explaining the 
ineffectiveness of market-type reforms during transition (Nemec and Kolisnichenko, 2006). 
Widespread informal payments and the introduction of user charges, it was argued, directly 
affected equal access along with lack of effective patient charters and complaints system 
(Nemec and Kolisnichenko, 2006).  
Though 50% of studies in this category of market mechanisms found that access decreased, 
this does not apply to all cases considered, some of which found evidence of no change or 
even improved access. For example, in Estonia giving patients the opportunity to choose a 
primary healthcare provider of their choice was found to improve both access and systemic 
efficiency compared to the situation before the reform (Atun et al., 2006). A number of 
success factors were identified including: effective management and leadership, good 
coordination between policy design and implementation, early investment in training and the 
creation early on of a critical mass of supporters in the field (Atun et al., 2006). This shows 
again that under certain favorable conditions concerning policy design and implementation, 
market-type mechanisms may work. A UK study reviewing experiences with user choice 
concluded that access did not deteriorate after the reform, and choice could improve equal 
access if safeguards were designed into choice arrangements. The study also found that choice 
and voice are not necessarily a top priority for users who are more likely to be concerned 
about quality standards. As the previous study, this case found the design and implementation 
of choice schemes can prove essential (Public Administration Select Committee, 2005).  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have reviewed the limited available evidence on the relationship between the 
introduction of market-type mechanisms and service equity in the European public sector. We 
also supplemented this analysis with a consideration of the trade-off between efficiency and 
equity where the studies that we review allowed. Our assessment of this literature suggests 
that some market-type mechanisms, such as user charges, liberalization and privatization are 
more likely to result in reductions in service equity than improvements, but that those 
reductions are not necessarily occurring against a backdrop of efficiency gains. In fact, in 
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some cases both efficiency and equity have gone hand-in-hand with the adoption of market-
type mechanisms. This has included cases of improved access and/or efficiency. Thus, despite 
the oft-quoted argument that market-based public sector reforms generate unavoidable trade-
offs between efficiency and equity, there is presently a dearth of conclusive evidence 
supporting this position for European public sector organizations. The findings from our 
review therefore have important theoretical and practical implications. 
In theoretical terms, our review cautions against essentialising accounts of the nature of 
marketisation in the public sector. Analysis of the findings from the studies we review casts 
doubt on simplistic accounts of the costs and benefits of market-type mechanisms, and 
suggest that there may be nothing inherently harmful to equity in marketisation, or indeed 
inherently beneficial for efficiency. In particular, our thick descriptions of the findings from 
the studies that we review highlights that the way in which market-type mechanisms are 
implemented and managed is as likely to influence the prospects of success, as much as 
anything inherent in the qualities of such reforms. All of which highlights that theorists of 
public sector marketisation should do more to incorporate the managerial and organizational 
factors that may be critical to the success of outsourcing, quasi-markets and choice-based 
mechanisms into their conceptual models and frameworks.  
In practical terms, our review indicates that it is possible for governments to realise the aims 
guiding the introduction of market-type mechanisms. However, this is not something that can 
be taken for granted, but needs to be considered at every phase of marketisation. Further 
research is therefore required to identify precisely how and in what circumstances different 
approaches to the implementation of market-type mechanisms are likely to prove most 
successful for outsourcing, quasi-markets and choice-based mechanisms. Our review 
highlights that valuable knowledge about the key enablers and barriers to marketisation 
success can be gleaned from a variety of sources, so researchers and policy-makers should 
remain open to the use of a wide range of study methods and designs to study the nature of 
market-type mechanisms in the public sector. A few other empirical investigations have been 
conducted recently that improve our understanding of the relationship between market-based 
reform and equal access across Europe. One study found that increasing choice in services of 
general interest beyond a certain threshold is likely to affect the actual use of choice by 
vulnerable, less-educated groups (Jilke, 2014). This evidence was found for mobile telephony, 
but not in the case of fixed telephony, which was deemed less competitive and less complex. 
Exercising voice concerning the quality of public services is also likely to depend on socio-
demographic factors (e.g. Jilke and Van de Walle, 2013).  
With the issue of public service efficiency still at the top of the policy agenda, governments 
across Europe will need to ensure that any new market-based reforms are designed in such a 
way as to deliver cost-effective public services. At the same time, the on-going concern with 
social exclusion and social cohesion as intractable ‘wicked issues’ within European societies, 
illustrates that governments continue to have a key role to play in upholding social equity. 
The design of market-type mechanisms that can successfully enhance value for money whilst 
enhancing (or at least not damaging) access to public services will therefore become 
increasingly important in the coming years. 
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